



Rejoinder to the Kyle Swan Response 
J. C. Lester (October 2002; revised May 2021)  
Contra critical rationalism, the response begins by referring to “the variety of internalist and 
externalist versions of foundationalism” (Liberty, December 2002). But it makes no attempt to 
explain or defend any of them. Hence, no further criticism is due here. The response then argues 
that, “The critical rationalist method seems to suggest that Lester’s extreme compatibility thesis 
is probably false” because—quoting Escape from Leviathan (EfL)—“bold universal theories 
might be false, and probably are” and yet “he doesn’t think the thesis is probably false”; and 
so this is, by implication, an inconsistent belief. But the Compatibility Thesis (CT) is not one 
of the “bold universal theories” of science. The review and the response appear, at times, to 
assume that the CT is a bold universal theory about the perfect compatibility of applying the 
relevant conceptions, or theories, of rationality, liberty, welfare, and anarchy; at other times 
they assert that it is not bold at all but merely about definitions designed to be compatible. In 
fact, the CT asserts both that there are no theoretical incompatibilities among relevant and 
plausible versions of the theories, and no actual long-term, systemic, and practical conflicts 
among applying them. That is still a bold theory (perhaps even many libertarians would 
disagree with it), but it’s not a universal thesis of perfect compatibility. And if it were good 
practice to reject a theory just because of its boldness, then all scientific theories would be 
immediately rejected without even trying to produce a falsification. In any case, as stated in 
the reply, anyone’s mere beliefs are irrelevant to the truth of objective theories and the 
soundness of objective arguments. 
The response reasserts that “questions regarding the logical compatibility of ideas depend upon 
one’s definitions of those ideas”. Therefore, it is here reasserted that EfL is defending the 
relevance and practical compatibility of certain theories. This cannot be reduced to whether 
certain “definitions” are logically consistent. The response insists that “in order to deal with 
certain practical problems, Lester must fiddle with” the “definitions”. It is not a “fiddle with” 
the “definitions” but various arguments that explain that applying the libertarian conception of 
liberty-in-itself, as EfL theorises and defends it, “isn’t always compatible with absolute private 
property rights”. It is hard to see why the response sees EfL’s answer to David Friedman’s 
apparent paradox of absolute property rights as mere definition-fiddling rather than a serious 
philosophical answer. 
On the reply to Rothbard on this issue, the response holds that applying EfL’s conception of 
liberty “isn’t possible here unless the property rights of the others are compromised or modified 
in some way”. That is approximately right. When there are inevitable practical clashes of 
liberty, as EfL explains will happen, normal understandings of libertarian property rights have 
to be modified to maximise liberty (but, more strictly, fully libertarian-derived property rights 
can only be respected in this way). The response continues, “But alternatively, the other’s 
absolute control of their property isn’t possible here unless the individual liberty of the first 
person is compromised”. Why should he have such absolute control if it clashes with liberty? 
The response implies that absolute control is somehow libertarian. EfL explains why it isn’t. 
As the response observes, with EfL’s “definition” (theory) “it is not generally possible to secure 
for someone the absence of proactive impositions”, and so we can only maximise liberty 
(minimise proactive impositions) as far as is practical. The response insists that this shows that 
liberty is “compromised”. It is true that we have to make ‘compromises’ in terms of absolute 




people at all times is simply not an option, it is hard to see why the response assumes liberty 
as a goal to be aimed at has been “compromised”. What other aim has compromised liberty?  
The response also assumes that minimising proactive impositions (maximising liberty) is “a 
retreat from the compatibility thesis as [EfL] initially formulated it. It amounts to an admission 
that liberty as absence of proactive impositions is not ‘in practice and in the long term’ 
compatible with general welfare and private property”. Perhaps no statement is so perfectly 
unambiguous that it can never be misunderstood. But why does the response assume that EfL 
puts forward a thesis involving everyone having perfect liberty-in-itself when it argues 
throughout that such liberty can only be maximised in practice? Or if one assumes that EfL is 
“initially” committed to perfect liberty, then why not also assume that it is committed to perfect 
welfare (having all of your unimposed wants satisfied) and perfect private property (with never 
any interference or compromise)—both of which are also not practical—and then assert that 
EfL retreats from them too? The CT is ‘only’ that all three are maximised together. 
Hence, there is no “retreat”. The maximalist theory appears to be bolder than other versions of 
libertarianism. But it is not so bold as to be perfectionist. And it is misleading to say that “Non-
anarchists, non-libertarians, even political liberals agree with Lester that proactive impositions 
should be minimized”. Those groups are usually fully prepared to allow proactive impositions 
in order to achieve “other values in the political realm”. They are not in any way aiming at a 
“minimal level” of proactive impositions; and they are often even reckless or oblivious 
concerning liberty. The response then states that it is “misleading for [EfL] to claim that [it’s] 
offering an account of the objective compatibility of all these values”. But EfL’s reconciliation 
concerns only certain objective theories of liberty, welfare, and anarchy and their objective 
compatibility. It does not at any time present or defend these as “values” that ought to be held. 
Why is its approach not objective?  
When the reply to the review says that liberty-in-itself as the absence of proactive impositions 
is incompatible with absolute control of private property, it means to imply in Friedman’s and 
Rothbard’s type of examples; not in every possible instance. It is still hard to see what this has 
to do with the response’s discussion of intellectual property, where copyrights and patents still 
appear to be confused. The response supposes that if the independent later inventor of an “idea” 
can have the “copyright” (surely, patent) and “absolute control”, then EfL agrees that “the 
liberty as absence of proactive impositions of the former person is compromised”. But under 
EfL’s theory of intellectual property both the first inventor and the independent later inventor 
of an idea would, in principle, be entitled to a libertarian share of the patent (until such time 
as, counterfactually, that thing would likely have been invented by some third person). The 
response then asserts that “in the case of patents, the liberty of others as Lester defines it is 
expanded as the patent holder’s control of his property is compromised”. This is hard to 
interpret clearly without a more-detailed explanation. But there is no proactive imposition on 
other people with a patent that fits EfL’s theory. And so “the liberty of others … is [not] 
expanded as the patent holder’s control of his [intellectual] property is compromised”. It is the 
benefits of others that are expanded at the patent holder’s proactively imposed expense. 
Finally, the response reasserts that “given [EfL’s] definition of what rationality is and its 
purported connection to welfare as want-satisfaction, [the reply is] committed to the 
implausible claim that the person [it] imagined has enhanced his welfare by drinking the 
gasoline”. This is a mistake. The rationality theory is that people try to obtain what they think 
it best to have at that moment and in the perceived circumstances. The welfare theory is that 




the gasoline by mistake will obviously decrease this overall want-satisfaction. Thus, there is 
no implication that the satisfaction of such mistaken wants contributes to such overall welfare. 
Doubtless, there is still much confusion on both sides about exactly what the other side is 
arguing on many of these issues. But perhaps at least some of the issues have been somewhat 
clarified. It is worth repeating that a far clearer and highly concise version of this general 
philosophical theory of libertarianism is now available.1 Before tackling EfL, or subsequent 
books,2 it is probably best to consult that for an overview. 
 
1 See Lester, J. C. “Eleutherological-Conjecturalist Libertarianism: a Concise Philosophical 
Explanation”, PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/INDNLA. 
2 See relevant chapters in Lester, J. C. Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical 
Arguments (Buckingham: The University of Buckingham Press, 2014) and, to a lesser extent, 
Arguments for Liberty: A Libertarian Miscellany (Buckingham: The University of 
Buckingham Press, [2011] 2016). 
